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This article explores the economic incentives of dominant controlling shareholders with regard to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders, on the one hand, and the monitoring role of non-dominant large 
shareholders in family firms, on the other. The authors argue that family controlling shareholders (or family 
owners) do not share common interests with other shareholders. Drawing on 141 family firms in the 
manufacturing sector that were listed on Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian stock exchange) from 2003 to 
2006, the article finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between excess control rights and a firm's market 
performance. The findings also show that both the cash flow rights (i.e. claims on cash payouts) of family 
controlling shareholders and the presence of non-dominant large shareholders with the ability to contest 
control of the firm have a positive relationship with market performance.  
This study contributes to the literature by indicating that family owners are unlikely to collude with other 
large shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Furthermore, low levels of excess family-owner 
control rights are beneficial for market performance because firms may benefit from group affiliations and 
receive patronage from wealthy owners. However, high levels of excess control rights are understood to be 
an economic incentive for family owners to expropriate minority shareholders during non-crisis periods. 
Key words: governance, family firms, ownership concentration, cash flow rights, excess control rights 
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1 
Introduction 
Studies of corporate governance have clearly 
demonstrated that ownership structures in 
many emerging economies exhibit high levels 
of ownership concentration (Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Claessens & Fan, 
2002; Steyn & Stainbank, 2013). In East Asia, 
wealth concentration is prevalent, and equity 
ownership is concentrated within families 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002). Consequently, there 
is limited demarcation between ownership and 
management in family firms. Minority share-
holders may be expropriated when the interests 
of controlling shareholders do not align 
completely with those of minority shareholders 
(Jiang & Peng, 2011) in what agency theory 
calls principal-to-principal conflicts. 
Broadly speaking, two branches of the 
literature are relevant in analysing large 
shareholders in emerging economies. The first 
branch considers ownership concentration as 
the economic incentive for large shareholders 
to monitor and control firms. However, high 
ownership concentration may also lead to 
expropriations by controlling shareholders in 
emerging economies (Claessens, Simeon, Fan 
& Lang, 2002). Prior empirical studies have 
discovered conflicting evidence about the 
relationship between ownership concentration 
among multiple large shareholders and firm 
performance in emerging economies (e.g. 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Chen, Li  & Shapiro, 
2011; Choi, Park & Hong, 2012). Several 
studies have found a positive and significant 
relationship between ownership concentration 
among multiple large shareholders and firm 
performance (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Driffield, Mahambare 
& Pal, 2007). However, other studies have 
shown that ownership concentration among 
Abstract 
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multiple large shareholders is not significantly 
related to firm performance (Claessens, Djankov 
& Lang 2000; Choi, Park & Hong, 2012). 
Notably, the recent study by Chen et al. (2011) 
indicated a significant and inverted U-shaped 
relationship between ownership concentration 
(shareholdings owned by the ten largest 
shareholders) and firm performance in China. 
Chen et al. (2011) concluded that large 
shareholders—whether large shareholders were 
private or state shareholders—colluded to 
expropriate minority shareholders when owner- 
ship concentration was high. Thus, the 
conflicting and ambiguous empirical findings 
on ownership concentration in emerging 
countries demand more research attention. 
The second branch of the literature has 
focused on excess control rights of dominant 
controlling shareholders (or the largest share-
holders) as the economic incentives to 
expropriate minority shareholders in emerging 
economies. Excess control rights can be 
defined as control rights in excess of cash flow 
rights (Driffield et al., 2007; Jiang & Peng, 
2011). Several researchers have argued that 
excess control rights owned by dominant 
controlling shareholders were linked to poor 
firm performance during the East Asia 
financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Claessens et al., 
1999a; Claessens et al., 1999b; Claessens et 
al., 2002; Lins, 2003), i.e. excess control rights 
are an economic incentive for dominant 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders. However, Driffield et al. (2007) 
found that dominant controlling shareholders 
with excess control rights did not produce 
exclusively negative effects on firm perfor-
mance when the study period was extended to 
the non-crisis period of 1994-1998 in East 
Asia. This conflicting empirical evidence has 
raised the question of whether the excess 
control rights of dominant controlling share-
holders adversely affect firm performance 
during non-crisis periods. 
Thus, this article attempts to fill the research 
gaps regarding the ambiguous findings on the 
impact of ownership concentration among 
multiple large shareholders and excess control 
rights on firm performance during non-crisis 
periods. The article also addresses the call 
from Steyn and Stainbank (2013) to investigate 
the cost and benefits of firm control owned by 
dominant controlling shareholders in corporate 
governance. This study focuses on family 
firms to examine the economic incentives of 
family controlling shareholders in firm 
monitoring and management under the theory 
that family firms tend to prioritise firm control 
and family interests in business enterprises, 
and that family controlling shareholders are 
unlikely to share common interests with other 
large shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, 
Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2007; Tam & Tan, 2007). Additionally, the 
ultimate ownership concept was employed to 
examine the economic incentives of family 
controlling shareholders in corporate governance. 
The ultimate ownership concept posits that 
controlling shareholders can leverage cash 
flow rights to achieve greater firm control 
through pyramid or cross-holding structures 
(Porta et al., 1999). 
This study focuses on a single-country study 
because the emergence of organisation structure 
is heavily influenced by institutional context 
(Wielemaker & Gedajlovic, 2011). Malaysia is 
an excellent empirical context for investigating 
the economic incentive of controlling share-
holders in expropriation of minority shareholders 
because of the prevalent firm control practice 
of using cross-sectional and pyramid structures. 
Corporate practitioners also perceived severe 
concerns about the expropriation of minority 
shareholders in Malaysia (Liew, 2007). 
The rest of the article is organised as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and formulates hypotheses. Section 3 
discusses the datasets and research methods. 
The main results are presented in Section 4, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
2 
Literature review and  
hypotheses development 
2.1 Economic incentives for family 
controlling shareholders in 
corporate governance 
In general, there is a high level of equity 
ownership concentration in Asian emerging 
markets (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011). Additionally, ownership interests 
and firm management are frequently inter-
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twined, and this has led to the corporate 
governance research to focus on the economic 
incentives of dominant controlling shareholders 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002; Claessens et al., 
2002). However, empirical studies in this line 
of research have revealed inconclusive evidence 
about the relationship between the ownership 
interests of dominant controlling shareholder 
and firm performance (e.g. Claessens & 
Djankov, 1999; Claessens et al., 1999a; Tam & 
Tan, 2007). On the one hand, Claessens et al. 
(1999a) and Claessens et al. (1999b) have 
indicated that the concentrated ownership by 
controlling shareholders is detrimental to firm 
performance in East Asian countries. On the 
other hand, Tam and Tan (2007) has offered 
evidence that firm performance is not affected 
by the concentrated ownership by dominant 
controlling shareholders in Malaysia. Perhaps 
the researchers should first determine the 
reasons why concentrated ownership by 
dominant controlling shareholders may not be 
beneficial to firm performance. 
In agency theory, economic utility is the 
main incentive for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006), which is  also consistent with 
the argument that controlling shareholders may 
not necessarily share common interests with 
other investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Expropriating minority shareholders allows 
controlling shareholders to reap exclusive 
benefits while some proportion of the costs are 
borne by minority shareholders (Claessens & 
Fan, 2002). For example, the controlling 
shareholders who engage in a non-arms-length 
transaction with controlled firms would reap 
all the benefits, but would only be liable for a 
portion of the cash flow claims. 
To understand how concentrated ownership 
by controlling shareholders affects firm 
performance, Porta et al. (1999) conceptualises 
the term ‘ultimate ownership’ to evaluate the 
ownership of dominant controlling shareholders. 
As opposed to traditional approaches, ultimate 
ownership does not assume that shareholdings 
are equivalent to ownership. Instead, the 
ultimate ownership concept views voting rights 
as the ownership of the shareholder. This 
definition encompasses the scenario in which 
the shareholder has greater voting rights vis-à-
vis cash flow rights (i.e. claims on cash 
payout). The use of ‘ultimate ownership’ can 
determine the real power of shareholdings and 
how dominant controlling shareholders maintain 
control over the firm via pyramid or cross-
holding structures. Therefore, ultimate share-
holdings might more clearly explain the 
incentives and entrenchment effects of con-
trolling shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002).  
Excess control rights theory suggests that 
dominant controlling shareholders have an 
incentive to appropriate firm resources. Con-
sistent with this argument, previous empirical 
studies have indicated that excess control 
rights wielded by controlling shareholders 
generally led to lower firm performance in 
emerging economies during the 1997-1998 
East Asian Financial crisis (Claessens et al., 
1999a; Claessens et al., 1999b; Claessens et 
al., 2002; Jiang & Peng, 2011). Previous 
research has also indicated that the market 
valuation of firm performance in emerging 
economies will be reduced when management 
increases its cash flow rights to achieve control 
over the firm because investors are aware of 
the potential managerial entrenchment that 
stems from misaligned incentives (Lins, 2003). 
The excess control rights owned by controlling 
shareholders threatens the confidence of 
minority investors because there is a general 
perception that controlling shareholders will 
expropriate minority shareholders particularly 
during crisis periods (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton & Jiang, 2008).  
However, the excess control rights of 
controlling shareholders may not necessarily 
impose harmful effects on firm performance. 
Notably, excess control rights typically imply 
that the firm is affiliated with pyramidal 
business groups (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006) 
and thus with wealthy owners (Heugens et al., 
2009). A group-affiliated firm may benefit 
from the economies of scale offered by large 
group-affiliated business in two ways (Carney, 
Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen & Van 
Oosterhout, 2011). First, a group-affiliated 
firm can access the intangible resources of the 
entire business group for various ventures. For 
instance, the firm may leverage the 'family-
based brand' in the family business group to 
enhance customer confidence in new products 
(Craig, Dibrell & Davis, 2008). Second, a 
group-affiliated firm is equipped with stronger 
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business networks to internalise transaction 
costs in inefficient market environments 
because a high level of trust exists between the 
affiliated businesses (Peng & Zhou, 2005). A 
firm that is part of an affiliated group might 
also achieve higher profits through internal 
business transactions on top of regular 
business activities (Chang & Hong, 2000). 
Additionally, wealthy owners from business 
groups possess the ability to inject personal 
resources into firms for business venturing. 
The benefits of group-affiliated firms and 
concerns about incentives for expropriation 
induce the question of whether excess control 
rights are harmful or beneficial to firm 
performance. A related study on the effect of 
excess control rights on controlling share-
holders in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand during the 1994-1998 period sheds 
some light on this controversial issue (Driffield 
et al., 2007). The Driffield study indicated that 
there was a non-monotonic relationship between 
the excess control rights of dominant control-
ling shareholders and firm performance. In that 
particular study, two dummy variables were 
used to represent the level of excess control 
rights simultaneously: (i) a dummy variable 
that assumed the value of ‘1’ if voting rights 
exceeded cash flow rights, and (ii) a dummy 
variable that assumed the value ‘1’ if excess 
control rights exceeded the median level of 
excess control rights in the samples. Specifically, 
Driffield et al. (2007) found that a low level of 
excess control rights was positive to firm 
performance, but a high level of excess control 
rights was detrimental to firm performance. 
Based on these findings, it is likely that the 
relative strength of beneficial and harmful 
effects vary with the level of excess control 
rights. The benefits of being a group-affiliated 
firm in a family business group dominate the 
expropriation effect when there is a low level 
of excess control rights during a non-crisis 
period, which would indicate that there is a 
positive market premium under such conditions. 
However, expropriation concerns are expected 
to dominate when controlling shareholders are 
exposed to high levels of incentives with high 
levels of excess control rights. Thus, the first 
hypothesis was formulated as follows: 
H1: There is an inverse U-shaped relation-
ship between excess control rights and 
firm performance during non-crisis periods. 
As described in the previous discussion 
leading to Hypothesis 1, the separation of cash 
flow and control rights (or excess control 
rights) leads to concerns about expropriation 
and to the conclusion that the concentrated 
cash flow rights provide an economic incentive 
for dominant controlling shareholders to 
engage in firm monitoring and management. 
Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi (1997) indicated 
that large ownership stakes have an immediate 
impact on shareholders' decisions to monitor 
and control firms when there are no deviations 
of cash flow and control rights. A shareholder 
will evaluate potential gain against potential 
loss when engaging in firm monitoring and 
control based on owned portion of shares. 
Thus, the economic incentive of cash flow 
rights is the prime motivation for dominant 
controlling shareholders to engage in firm 
monitoring and management.  
Similar examples can be found in both 
theoretical and empirical studies. For example, 
several studies in emerging economies in Asia 
have indicated that the cash flow rights of 
dominant controlling shareholders were generally 
positive for firm market performance (Claessens 
et al., 1999a; Claessens et al., 1999b; Claessens 
et al., 2002). Based on these examples, cash 
flow rights are the economic incentives for 
dominant controlling shareholders to monitor 
effectively as per the following hypothesis: 
H2. The cash flow rights of family 
controlling shareholders are positively related 
to firm performance. 
2.2  The role of non-dominant large 
shareholders in family firms 
Two related bodies of research address the role 
of multiple large shareholders in the ownership 
structure. The first body of research focuses on 
the impact of multiple large shareholders on 
alleviating concerns about expropriation by the 
dominant controlling shareholder (Bennedsen 
& Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch & Hege, 2001; Su, 
Xu & Phan, 2008). Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
(2000) developed a hypothetical model to 
examine how large shareholders could form a 
coalition to share control of the firm. The 
model demonstrates that the presence of 
multiple large shareholders with sufficient cash 
flow stakes may be effective in inducing 
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mutual monitoring and limiting the consump-
tion of private benefits. Additionally, Bloch 
and Hege (2001) proposed a competition 
model that indicates the presence of two large 
shareholders in the firms might shift the 
attention of the large shareholders in order to 
compete for corporate control instead of 
extracting private benefits. The rationale is that 
each large shareholder is willing to sacrifice 
private benefits to gain support from the 
minority shareholders. Therefore, large share-
holders resort to submitting corporate proposals 
that are favoured by minority shareholders. 
The proposed model is also manifested in 
actual competition for corporate control in 
Malaysia. For example, Khoo (2013) reported 
that dominant controlling shareholder from 
Bright Packaging Industry Berhad in Malaysia 
resorted to proposing a 100 per cent  dividend 
payout policy to gain support from minority 
shareholders and to prevent a takeover by a 
coalition of non-dominant large shareholders. 
Su et al. (2008) also provided evidence that the 
largest shareholders require a high level of 
voting power concentration to gain control of a 
board of directors and extract private rents in 
China, which implies that dominant controlling 
shareholders are likely to lose the exclusive 
control with the presence of non-dominant 
large shareholders. The evidence given is also 
consistent with the argument that principal-to-
principal conflicts are largely dependent on 
whether controlling shareholders have strong 
controlling power in corporate control (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). 
The second body of research focuses on 
whether and how multiple large shareholders 
collude to expropriate minority shareholders 
(Zwiebel, 1995; Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 
2000; Gomes & Novaes, 2005). Notably, an 
empirical study by Chen et al. (2011) found 
that the ownership concentration of the ten 
largest shareholders exhibits an inverted U-
shaped relationship with firm performance in 
China. Whilst the study by Chen et al. (2011) 
seems to provide support for second body of 
research, it is unlikely to be applicable to 
family firms for several reasons. 
To illustrate, Zwiebel (1995) proposed a 
model that indicated that the presence of 
multiple large shareholders in the ownership 
structure makes the shareholders susceptible to 
colluding to extract and share the control 
benefits of the firm. The underpinning assump-
tion is that the benefits of control are divisible 
among large shareholders. However, this 
assumption may not be practical because the 
types of controlling shareholders may also 
affect the objectives behind gaining firm 
control. Specifically, family controlling share-
holders tend to prioritise firm control and 
family interests in business enterprises, 
associated with strong emotional components 
and prioritise the family welfare in firm 
decision-making (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Likewise, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) 
developed a model to elucidate that the large 
shareholders with the greatest excess control 
rights may form a coalition to seize control of 
the firm. Subsequently, controlling shareholders 
may expropriate non-controlling shareholders. 
This scenario, however, is unlikely to occur in 
practice because no empirical evidence has 
indicated large shareholders in emerging 
economies have low concentrations of cash 
flow rights. Additionally, the empirical studies 
indicate that activism by large shareholders 
such as institutional investors can improve 
firm performance (Le, Walters & Kroll, 2006; 
King & Wen, 2011). Furthermore, some 
institutional investors with short-term investment 
horizon may be reluctant to engage in firm 
monitoring and may prefer to liquidate shares 
when the firm's prospects deteriorate (Le et al., 
2006; Rasli, Goh & Khan, 2013).  
Similarly, Gomes and Novaes (2005) 
developed a theoretical model that indicates 
multiple large shareholders may share control 
and collude to share the private rents extracted 
from firm’s resources. Gomes and Novaes 
(2005) also indicated that more balanced 
control between large shareholders can increase 
the minority shareholder protection in 
economies with weak legal institutions. The 
main rationale is that controlling shareholders 
are exposed to greater incentives to extract 
private rents in a weak legal environment. 
Thus, the control contestability exercised by 
non-dominant large shareholders can be 
effective to monitor dominant controlling 
shareholders in emerging economies. 
The literature discussed above suggests that 
the control contestability exercised by non-
dominant large shareholders will limit the 
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opportunistic behaviour of dominant 
controlling shareholders in extracting private 
benefits. Specifically, family controlling share-
holders, who tend to prioritise firm control and 
family interests in business enterprises, are 
unlikely to share common interests with other 
large shareholders in family firms (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007). Thus, 
high control contestability exercised by non-
dominant large shareholders is an effective 
monitoring mechanism and will translate into a 
countering effect on the self-serving behaviour 
of family controlling shareholders, which leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H3. The level of control contestability 
exercised by a large shareholder (or a coalition 
of large shareholders) with respect to family 
controlling shareholders is positively related to 
firm performance. 
3 
Methodology 
3.1 Data Collection 
The ‘Industrial Products’ sector index on Bursa 
Malaysia (the Malaysian stock exchange) was 
the sample selection used to identify the 
manufacturing firms. Subsequently, family 
firms were identified as those in which the 
ultimate family owners own at least 10 per 
cent  of the voting rights and appear to be the 
largest shareholder in the firms (Porta et al., 
1999; Claessens et al., 2002). The data were 
collected using annual reports, company 
announcements database, and Datastream. The 
reliability and comprehensiveness of data is 
covered because Bursa Malaysia requires firms 
to report ownership and family relations 
(including substantial shareholders and directors) 
in annual reports. Additionally, this research 
tracks ultimate ownership by using the dis-
closed ownership information in annual reports 
and ‘change in shareholdings’ in company 
announcements databases available through 
Bursa Malaysia. The market equity prices and 
financial information of the firms are obtained 
via Datastream. 
This study selects 2003-2006, which is a 
stable economic phase of the Malaysian 
economy, as the sample period to investigate 
economic incentives of family controlling 
shareholders. The 2007-2009 financial crisis 
periods which had adversely affected Malaysian 
economy are avoided (Gomez, 2012). Addition- 
ally, temporal changes of ownership structure 
may occur after the Malaysian government had 
reduced the quota for Bumiputera equity 
requirement for newly listed companies from 
30 per cent to 12.5 per cent in 2009 (Gomez, 
2012). The final dataset covering 141 family 
firms over a four-year period leads to 564 
firm-year observations. 
3.2 Methods 
The Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation 
Modelling (PLS-SEM) method is used to test 
the proposed theoretical hypotheses in this 
study. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
was employed because the governance 
variables can be measured by more than one 
observed variable (Johnson & Greening, 1999; 
Lin, 2005; Azim, 2012). PLS-SEM, a non-
parametric SEM approach, is more appropriate 
compared to covariance-based SEM because 
PLS-SEM allows the modelling of non-linear 
relations (Rigdon, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2010). 
This study adopted the SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, 
Wende & Will, 2005) with path weighting 
scheme to test the hypotheses. In reporting the 
PLS-SEM results, a two-step approach, was 
followed to assess the measurement models 
and the structural model (Chin, 2010). 
3.3 Measures 
This study employed PLS-SEM, which is a 
construct-oriented approach, in model estimations. 
A single-item measure was used when no 
latent variables were available (Li, Lam, Qian 
& Fang, 2006). The single-item measure has 
been used in prior corporate governance 
studies that utilised structural equation model-
ling (Li et al., 2006; Tam & Tan, 2007; Azim, 
2012; Berthelot, Francoeur & Labelle, 2012). 
Additionally, the single-item construct (or 
concrete construct) is appropriate in structural 
equation modelling when only one attribute is 
represented (Diamantopoulos, Arstedt, Fuchs, 
Wilczynski & Kaiser,  2012). 
Endogenous construct. The endogenous 
construct used is firm performance. The firm 
performance construct was the market-to-book 
ratio, in which firm performance is the ratio of 
the market value of common stock and book 
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value of preferred shares and debt to the book 
value of total assets. Market-based firm 
performance (i.e. market-to-book ratio) is the 
appropriate measure in emerging markets 
because market investors would perceive it as 
a discount in the fair value of shares due to 
principal-to-principal conflicts in the ownership 
structure (Claessens et al., 2002; Young et al., 
2008). 
Predictor constructs. The economic incentives 
for family controlling shareholders are examined 
by cash flow rights and excess control rights 
whereas monitoring of non-dominant large 
shareholders is represented by control contest-
ability. 
The cash flow rights represented the cash 
flow rights of the family controlling share-
holders who are also the largest shareholders in 
the ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Laeven & Levine, 2008; Attig, El Ghoul & 
Guedhami, 2009). The main contention of this 
study is that cash flow rights is the appropriate 
measure of economic incentive for family 
owners in firm management and monitoring. 
Excess control rights were calculated as the 
difference between voting rights and cash flow 
rights held by the family controlling share-
holders (Claessens et al., 2002; Laeven & 
Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009; Jiang & Peng, 
2011). The excess control rights represent the 
ultimate owners’ utilisation of cross-sectional 
or pyramid structures to manipulate share-
holdings and achieve greater control over the 
firm. The square of excess control rights was 
also included because of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship proposed in the hypothesis H1. 
Control contestability was measured by two 
items: (i) the ratio of the voting rights of the 
second largest shareholder to the voting rights 
of the family controlling shareholders and (ii) 
the ratio of the combined voting rights of the 
second to the fifth largest shareholders to the 
voting rights of family controlling shareholders 
(Attig et al., 2009). The purpose of control 
contestability is to reflect the balance of power 
between family controlling shareholders and 
non-dominant large shareholders in the owner-
ship structure.  
Controls. This study controls firm invest-
ment, capital structure, firm size and year in 
the proposed theoretical model. Firm 
investment represented the capital intensity, i.e. 
capital expenditure divided by total sales 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Capital structure 
was the ratio of total debt to total assets 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Firm size was 
measured by two items: (i) the book value of 
firm assets and (ii) firm sales. Three dummy 
year variables 2004-2006 are included to 
control year fixed effect (Chen et al., 2011) 
whereas year 2003 is omitted as the reference 
year. 
The research model for all hypothetical 
relationships in this study is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Proposed theoretical model of this study 
Firm 
performance 
Control 
contestability in 
the ownership 
structure 
 
Monitoring mechanism Economic incentives 
of family owners 
Excess 
control rights 
Cash flow 
rights 
H1∩ 
!
H2 + 
!
H3 + 
!
 
Source: Authors’ own construction 
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4 
Empirical results and discussions 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for 
key constructs. The average cash flow rights 
owned by family controlling shareholders are 
36.85 per cent  whereas on average, excess 
control rights are 1.27 per cent. Notably, the 
average control contestabiltiy exercised by 
non-dominant large shareholders is approxi-
mately 53.3 per cent, which implies that family 
controlling shareholders have strong control-
ling positions in most firms. With respect  
to firm-level characteristics, family firms  
have conservative business strategies (capital 
structures with an average leverage ratio of 
26.3 per cent) and low firm investment (with 
average capital expenditures only accounting 
for approximately 8.9 per cent of total sales). 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of constructs 
Constructs Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Firm performance 0.710 0.642 0.100 8.830 
Cash flow rights of family owners 36.853 14.390 7.930 78.040 
Excess control rights 1.271 4.555 0.000 26.650 
Square of excess control rights 22.326 91.054 0.000 710.240 
Control contestability+ 0.533 0.405 0.020 2.200 
Firm investment 0.089 0.134 0.000 1.330 
Capital structure  0.263 0.236 0.000 3.670 
Firm size+ 4.525 23.858 0.060 546.620 
Note: + two-item construct 
 
4.1 Measurement models 
The measurement models of reflective 
constructs were assessed based on indicator 
reliability, internal consistency reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity 
(see Tables 2 and 3) (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt, 
2011). 
 
Table 2 
Measurement model evaluation results 
Constructs (notation) Indicators Loading CR AVE 
Firm performance (MB) Market-to-book ratio 1 1 1 
Cash flow rights (Conc) Cash flow rights of family owners 1 1 1 
Excess control rights (ExC) Difference between voting and cash flow rights of 
family owners 
1 1 1 
Square of excess control 
rights (ExCSQ) 
Square of excess control rights 1 1 1 
Control contestability 
(Contest) 
The ratio of voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder to the voting rights of family owners 
0.996 0.970 0.941 
The ratio of the combined voting rights of second 
to fifth largest shareholders to the voting rights of 
the family owner 
0.943   
Capital structure (Lev) Ratio of total debt and total assets 1 1 1 
Firm investment (CAPEX) Capital expenditure divided by total sales 1 1 1 
Firm size (Size) Firm assets 0.869 0.871 0.771 
Sales 0.888   
Year 2004 (2004) 2004 1 1 1 
Year 2005 (2005) 2005 1 1 1 
Year 2006 (2006) 2006 1 1 1 
Note: CR stands for composite reliability; AVE stands for average varianced extracted. 
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Table 3 
Discriminant validity assessment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MB  1.00 
          Conc 0.10 1.00 
         ExC 0.03 0.22 1.00 
        ExCSQ 0.03 0.23 0.97 1.00 
       Contest  0.02 -0.67 -0.14 -0.14 0.97 
      CAPEX 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.02 1.00 
     Lev 0.37 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 1.00 
    Size -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.10 0.88 
   2004 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.03 1.00 
  2005 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.33 1.00 
 2006 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.09 -0.33 -0.33 1.00 
Note: The non-diagonal elements are the latent correlations while the diagonal elements (in bold) are the square roots of the 
AVEs. 
 
The results demonstrate that all indicator 
loadings are 0.869 or higher, which is above 
the minimum stipulated value of 0.70 and 
supports the indicator reliability in all 
reflective constructs (Hair et al., 2011). 
Likewise, all composite reliability values are 
above the minimum stipulated value of 0.7, 
and internal consistency reliability is achieved. 
Additionally, convergent validity is achieved 
because average variable extracted (AVE) is 
greater than the minimum stipulated value of 
0.50 (Hair et al., 2011). With respect to 
discriminant validity, the square roots of the 
AVEs are higher than all inter-construct 
correlations (see Table 3), which provides 
support for discriminant validity based on the 
Fornell-Larcker criterion (Hair et al., 2011). 
4.2 Structural model 
To estimate the statistical significance level of 
the path coefficients in the structural model, 
the standard bootstrapping procedure (564 
cases and 5000 samples) with the no sign 
changes option was performed. Notably, the 
validity of the structural model is verified via 
predictive relevance (Hair et al., 2011). The 
endogenous constructs must achieve predictive 
relevance with the minimum threshold value of 
zero to indicate that the model can adequately 
predict the indicators of endogenous constructs. 
Following the guideline proposed by Hair et al. 
(2011), the blindfolding procedure was used to 
obtain the Q-square for the predictive 
relevance. 
Table 4 summarises the estimation results of 
the structural model. The Q-squared in Table 4 
is 0.19 and above zero, which supports the 
validity of the structural model. Consistent 
with H1, the results suggest that excess control 
rights exhibit an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship with firm performance. In effect, the 
excess control rights and square of excess 
control rights demonstrate a statistically 
significant relationship with firm performance 
(p < 0.05). However, the excess control rights 
have a positive path coefficient, whereas 
square of excess control rights have a negative 
path coefficient. These results support the 
contention in this study that excess control 
rights imply that the family firms are group-
affiliated firms and (or) associated with 
wealthy owners. Thus, these firms can access 
various resources through affiliated business 
networks to increase market competitiveness 
and, in turn, to achieve higher firm per-
formance. However, the high level of excess 
control rights provides significant economic 
incentive for family controlling shareholders to 
appropriate firm assets for own private benefit 
and negatively impact firm performance. 
Consistent with H2’s prediction that the 
cash flow rights of family controlling 
shareholders influence firm performance, the 
results show a positive and statistically 
significant relationship (p < 0.01) between 
cash flow rights and firm performance. The 
results affirmed the contention in this study 
that cash flow rights, not control rights, are the 
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economic incentive for family controlling 
shareholders to engage in firm monitoring and 
management. The cash flow rights of dominant 
controlling shareholders are particularly relevant 
in the ownership context in emerging markets 
which dominant controlling shareholders use 
cross-sectional and pyramid structures to 
control firms. 
 
Table 4 
PLS structural model results 
Endogenous 
constructs 
R2 Q2  
MB 0.187 0.190  
Relation Path coefficient S. E. T-stat 
Conc → MB (H2) 0.203* 0.060 3.380 
ExC → MB (H1) 0.225** 0.108 2.080 
ExCSQ → MB (H1) -0.204** 0.094 2.180 
Contest+ → MB (H3) 0.150** 0.068 2.217 
CAPEX → MB 0.016 0.056 0.283 
LEV →  MB 0.392*** 0.201 1.951 
Size+ → MB -0.092* 0.027 3.450 
Note: */**/*** significant at the 0.01/ 0.05/0.10 error levels, respectively; + two-item  
construct; dummy year variables are not shown 
 
Since control contestability was found to be 
positively related to firm performance (p < 
0.05), H3 is supported. It could be concluded 
that control contestability exercised by non-
dominant large shareholders can monitor 
family controlling shareholders effectively. 
These findings can be supported through prior 
empirical evidence that shows that the main 
objectives of family owners are protecting 
family interests and control in family firms 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). That is, family 
owners, i.e. owners who prioritise the trans-
generational control, are unlikely to collude 
with other large shareholders to harm the 
family reputation and the long-term prosperity 
of the firms. Additionally, the findings reject 
the view that excessive monitoring may hinder 
manager initiative to make profitable invest-
ments in technology-based firms (Grosfeld, 
2009), which might be explained by the 
possibility that the overlap between family 
shareholdings and management shifts the firm 
objectives to protect family interests.  
The control variables show certain notable 
findings (see Table 4). The results suggest that 
firm investment has a non-significant relation-
ship with firm performance, but firm size has a 
negative and statistically significant relationship 
with firm performance (p < 0.01). It could be 
that firm investment in family firms may focus 
on lowering the risk of investment and forgo 
profitable business investments in safeguarding 
family security (Tam & Tan, 2007; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010). This study also finds that 
firm leverage shows a positive, albeit mildly 
significant relationship with firm performance 
(p < 0.10), which can be attributed to proper 
use of debt and increasing shareholder return. 
5 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to examine the 
economic incentives of family controlling 
shareholders and the monitoring role of non-
dominant large shareholders in family firms. 
The results suggest that the excess control 
rights owned by family controlling share-
holders are not necessarily detrimental to firm 
performance because the firms can access 
more resources in wider business networks 
(the family business group) and (or) receive 
patronage from wealthy owners during non-
crisis periods. However, high levels of excess 
control rights translate into greater economic 
incentives for family controlling shareholders 
to expropriate the minority shareholders, 
which, in turn, harms firm performance. This 
phenomenon can be observed through an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between excess 
control rights and firm performance. The 
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findings warrant future research attention 
because the excess control rights imply that the 
family firm is a group-affiliated firm or 
associated with wealthy owners. 
Moreover, this study finds that the cash 
flow rights of family controlling shareholders 
exhibit a positive relationship with firm 
performance. This outcome suggests that cash 
flow rights represent the economic incentive 
for family controlling shareholders to monitor 
and control firms. The study also finds that the 
balance of voting power distributions between 
family controlling shareholders and non-
dominant large shareholders can be effective in 
monitoring family controlling shareholders. 
Stated differently, the second largest share-
holder and coalitions of non-dominant large 
shareholders can play a monitoring role in 
family firms. Thus, the study provides new 
evidence that large shareholders do not exhibit 
same behaviour in corporate governance or 
expropriating minority shareholders in family 
firms. The findings also lend support to the 
family business research in which a family 
controlling shareholder is a distinct economic 
entity that prioritises family interests (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). This study rejects the view 
that multiple large shareholders, including 
private shareholders, will collude to expro-
priate minority shareholders (Chen et al., 
2011). Specifically, family controlling share-
holders are unlikely to collude with other non-
dominant large shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders. 
There are two limitations in the article. The 
study is based on a sample of 141 family firms 
in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, and the 
generalisability may be most relevant to the 
technology-based sectors. The rationale for 
this is that the different activities of industries 
may limit the function of ownership structures 
in corporate governance. Additionally, the 
study mainly focused on the publicly traded 
family firms in Malaysia. Consequently, the 
generalisation the findings beyond publicly 
traded family firms may be limited because 
privately held firms are usually smaller and not 
bound to stringent corporate governance 
regulations. Further research may be extended 
to study whether control contestability 
exercised by non-dominant large shareholders 
could be an effective monitoring mechanism in 
privately held family firms. Extending this 
research by comparing with other advanced 
and emerging economies remains another 
avenue for further research. 
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